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Practical Guidance for Mental 
Health Practitioners and Social 
Workers
LoNE-ACToR TERRoRISTS ARE perceived as presenting acute challenges for law enforcement practitioners in detection and disruption. By definition, they act without direct command and control from a wider network, and it is assumed that without such communications they 
may evade the ‘tripwires’ that would usually bring them to the attention of the authorities. The 
Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project aims to investigate this assumption. Through the 
construction and analysis of a database of 120 lone actors from across Europe, it seeks to improve 
understanding of lone-actor terrorists, their behaviour and their activities in the period leading up 
to their intended attack. 
Lone-actor terrorism is defined by the CLAT project as follows:
The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal-
material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support 
in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by 
any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others).1
The project’s methodology, key findings, and recommendations for policymakers are detailed 
in previous CLAT publications.2 The aim of this paper is to draw out the practical implications of 
our research for mental health practitioners and social workers. It is not intended to provide a 
profile of lone-actor terrorists, but rather to offer guidance that may be of use to practitioners 
in Europe (and beyond), supporting the development of strategies to detect and deal with 
potential lone-actor terrorists and to understand the possible risk posed by persons of interest. 
Recognising the significant variations in the roles, responsibilities and operating practices of 
mental health practitioners and social workers across Europe, the guidance offered here is 
1. For further discussion regarding this definition and how it was established, please see Edwin 
Bakker and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Definitional Workshop’, RUSI 
Occasional Papers (December 2015), p. iii.
2. See in particular, Clare Ellis et al., ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper’, RUSI Occasional Paper 
(February 2016); Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, ‘Policy Paper 1: Personal 
Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists’ ICCT, 2016; Simon Palombi and Benoît Gomis, ‘Policy Paper 
2: Attack Methodology and Logistics’ Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security 
Studies on behalf of Chatham House, 2016; Melanie Smith, Sabine Barton and Jonathan Birdwell, 
‘Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and online Activity’ Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, 2016; Clare Ellis and Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Policy Paper 4: ‘Leakage’ and Interaction with 
Authorities’ Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016.
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intentionally broad and does not refer to current practice in individual states. This paper is 
accompanied by a counterpart that offers guidance for security practitioners.3
This paper presents three sets of recommendations offering guidance for mental health 
practitioners and social workers to prevent lone actor terrorism by sharing information, fostering 
engagement and awareness and a multi-agency approach.
Disclaimer
Despite extensive effort by the research team, the CLAT database does not contain every lone 
actor terrorism plot during the period studied. First, not all plots are in the public domain, 
especially where they have been abandoned, or disrupted at an early stage by the authorities. 
Second, there are variations across Europe in the way incidents are perceived and reported; for 
example, some incidents may be reported as a ‘hate crime’, but meet the criteria for inclusion 
in the CLAT database. 
There are also some important limitations to the data due to the use of open source reporting. 
First, complete information is not always available, leading to a number of variables containing 
high levels of ‘unknown’ entries. For some variables, this unavoidably limited the analysis that 
could be conducted and the strength of the conclusions that could be drawn. Second, there is 
an inevitable element of reporting bias: whether information is publically available in relation 
to an issue may depend on whether it was interesting to the journalists investigating the story. 
Finally, the research teams faced particular challenges in finding open source information in 
relation to mental health issues.
Personal Characteristics of Lone Actor Terrorists and 
Implications for Practitioners
The focus of the research by Leiden University has been on the personal characteristics of lone 
actor terrorists. It has listed and studied the following variables for 120 perpetrators of lone 
actor terrorism: Age, gender, education, employment, relationship status, having children or 
not, indication of successful sibling, indication of social isolation, previous criminal sanction, 
previous physical violence, evidence of drug use, indication of a mental health disorder, diagnosis 
and treatment for mental health issues, and indications of a noteworthy life event. In addition 
a workshop with practitioners was organised to discuss the key findings and their implications 
for mental health practitioners and social workers. The workshop also allowed practitioners to 
share best and worst practices. 
Key findings of the study of personal characteristics of lone actor terrorists were the following: 
• Religiously-inspired and right-wing ideologies have very different age profiles: the 
majority of religiously-inspired perpetrators were less than 25 years old, with the 
3. Clare Ellis and Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Toolkit Paper 2: Practical Guidance for 
Security Practitioners’, RUSI Occasional Papers (April 2016).
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number of perpetrators declining as age increased; this is in direct contrast to right-wing 
lone-actor terrorists where the majority were at least 40 years old. 
• The findings indicate a possible link between social isolation and mental health disorder; 
this was particularly pronounced in the case of school shooters. 
• Religiously-inspired perpetrators were seldom socially isolated. 
• Where legally owned firearms were the chosen weapon for attack, there was an 
indication of mental health disorder in 53 per cent of perpetrators. 
Although overall data metrics are useful, specifically focusing on certain sub-groups could 
provide more insight into shared characteristics of certain groups.
• In order to accurately interpret results, it is necessary to have appropriate benchmarks. 
For instance, we found that 35% of the perpetrators reportedly suffered from some kind 
of mental health disorder. The estimated percentage for the general population is 27%. 
• It is relevant to look into certain combinations of variables and characteristics, rather 
than single ones, such as legal gun possession and mental health problems.4
The implications of the findings of the study for practitioners and the outcome of the workshops 
are presented here in the form of three sets of recommendations or toolkits to help mental 
health practitioners and social workers to contribute to the prevention of lone actor terrorism. 
The first set focuses on sharing information; the second deals with engagement with relevant 
communities, creating awareness of the phenomenon of lone actor terrorism, and improving 
conditions to work with vulnerable populations. The third set looks into a multi-agency approach 
to lone actor terrorism.
Sharing Information
• Detecting potential lone actor terrorists can be described as trying to find the needle in 
the haystack. It is difficult, but not impossible as in this case, the haystack – the direct 
environment of the perpetrator – can help find the needle. There are many cases of 
leakage by lone actors – telling friends about their intentions or posting hints on the 
Internet – which means the haystack could provide relevant information. Moreover, 
there are many cases of lone actor terrorists of which their surroundings, in hindsight, 
had noticed certain behaviour that should have been taken seriously. 
• Investing in engagement and awareness among specific communities – see below – is 
one way to pick up signals. The other one is sharing (sensitive) information between 
relevant actors, in particular between mental health practitioners and law enforcement. 
of course it is important to be aware and respect legal and ethical boundaries.
• Be careful with hotlines for radicalisation. Some countries (e.g. France, Sweden, The 
Netherlands) have already established hotlines. others are considering to do so. Such 
ways of sharing information by non-professionals involves the risk of false positives. 
4. For the CLAT policy paper on personal characteristics of lone actor terrorists, see Jeanine de Roy 
van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, ‘Policy Paper 1: Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists’ 
ICCT, 2016.
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Ideally, a set of possible key indicators is needed to be able to avoid this. Such lists 
are not available. The best alternative is look for combinations of behaviour, personal 
characteristics and contextual factors. Think of the combinations of being bullied, being 
a young male with mental health issues, and having the possibility to acquire weapons 
as member of a shooting club. Such combinations are the ones to look for or to be 
extremely worried about.
• When diagnosing people, the behavioural aspects of a mental health disorder should 
be taken on board. What does it mean for the daily life of a person (and his or her 
surroundings) to have a certain mental health disorder? In some countries, assessing 
the behavioural aspects is a standard practice, in others not. Although this analysis is 
sensitive information, under certain conditions, this information should be shared with 
the relevant surroundings in order to make sure these persons are helped not to do 
harm to themselves nor to others.
Engagement and Awareness
• Lone actors are rarely solitary actors. In other words: they act alone, but are not alone. 
They are part of society: have neighbours, colleagues, family members and many have 
friends as well. This makes it worthwhile to invest in sensors within various communities 
by way of community engagement and awareness programmes. For youngsters and 
young adults, this means raising awareness of the phenomenon of lone actor terrorists 
at school or among youth workers. For the relatively older vulnerable groups, possible 
sensors include social welfare organisations and private business (employers). 
• In order to increase awareness of possible relevant combinations of indicators, it is 
recommended to develop anonymised biographies of lone actor terrorists and use 
them in training sessions with relevant actors.
• Investing in sensors within various communities requires building trust – between 
vulnerable communities and individuals on the one hand, and professionals on the 
other; and between various relevant actors, for instance between private business and 
the mental health sector. 
• Lowering barriers to mental health services is also very important. Part of this effort 
should be focused on removing taboos on speaking about mental health problems in 
certain communities. Trust and openness play a crucial role in this regard. 
• When trying to raise awareness it is important to see the issue of radicalisation and 
radical behaviour by lone actors as part of a larger debate on violence within society. 
This means the issue of radicalisation should be seen as part of a larger debate on 
violence, aggression and exclusion. A relevant example in the case of school shooters is 
the earlier mentioned bullying at school.
Multi-Agency Approach
• It is important to distinguish different types of cooperation between relevant actors:  from 
cooperation aimed at helping people in dealing with mental health issues and preventing 
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radicalisation and radical behaviour, to cooperation aimed at removing potentially 
dangerous people from society. Each type of cooperation needs different platforms. 
• When working together, it is important that everybody is on the same page and everyone 
has the same goals, and that people know and respect each other’s roles. 
• For the fixated, clearly mentally ill it is oftentimes quite clear what to do. Doing the right 
thing is much more difficult when mental health issues become less clear and the radical 
behaviour is more politically or ideologically motivated. Moreover, these potential lone 
actor terrorists operate more secretly, with less possibilities for early prevention and 
detection. It is important to realise the limitations of any preventative multi-agency 
approach. Some cases can only be detected by intelligence agencies.
• An important issue with cooperation between different actors on potential lone actor 
terrorists is that of access to data and safely storing data. The various partners must 
know who has access to what (part of the) data and where it is stored (and for how long). 
• Regarding the latter and other aspects of multi-agency cooperation, it is important to be 
aware of and discuss ethical and legal issues. 
Concluding Remarks
In this toolkit paper we have identified a number of key recommendations for mental health 
practitioners and social workers involved in dealing with (potential) lone actor terrorists. We 
should, however, be modest when assessing the chance of success in trying to prevent lone 
actor terrorism. It is, and will remain a difficult undertaking. However, against the backdrop of 
the enormous impact that some acts of this particular type of violence have on our societies, 
think of the attack by Anders Breivik, it is of utmost important to try to find ways to improve 
our efforts in countering lone actor terrorism. Many individual actors and agencies could 
contribute to this effort. Multi-agency cooperation and information-sharing are very important 
in this regard. 
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